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Abstract—Disclosure attacks aim at revealing communication
patterns in anonymous communication systems, such as conversa-
tion partners or conversation frequency. In this paper, we propose
a framework to compare between the members of the statistical
disclosure attack family. We compare different variants of the
Statistical Disclosure Attack (SDA) in the literature, together
with two new methods; as well as show their relation with the
Least Squares Disclosure Attack (LSDA).
We empirically explore the performance of the attacks with re-
spect to the different parameters of the system. Our experiments
show that i) our proposals considerably improve the state-of-the-
art SDA and ii) confirm that LSDA outperforms the SDA family
when the adversary has enough observations of the system.
Index Terms—anonymity, mixes, disclosure attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Mixes constitute the basic building block of high-latency
anonymous communication systems [1]. They act as a channel
that hides the correspondence between incoming and outgoing
messages, thus preventing a potential adversary from unveiling
users’ communication patterns (e.g. friendships, frequency).
There exist a wide variety of attacks that compromise
the anonymity provided by mixes. In this paper, we revisit
a particularly efficient family of attacks which is based on
the Statistical Disclosure Attack (SDA) [2] and propose a
framework that allows us to easily compare the attacks when
performed on threshold mixes. We revisit Mathewson and
Dingledine’s generalization of the SDA and propose two new
variants that outperform previous work. We also illustrate the
relation between the SDA and the Least Squares Disclosure
Attack (LSDA).
Additionally, we improve the theoretical analysis of the
LSDA in [3] and extend it to one of the proposed variants
of the SDA, which helps us understand the tradeoffs in
performance versus complexity when attacking mixes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we start with
a brief overview of the current attacks on threshold mixes in
Sect. II. In Sect. III, we introduce our system model and nota-
tion and then proceed with our revision of statistical disclosure
attacks in Sect. IV. We perform a theoretical analysis of the
attacks in Sect. V and validate our results in Sect. VI. Finally,
we conclude in Sect. VII.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
The Disclosure Attack [4] relies on Graph Theory to reveal
the exact set of friends of a user (Alice), seeking for mutually
disjoint sets of receivers. This attack is known to be NP-
complete but there exist other implementations that speed up
the search [5].
Danezis proposed the Statistical Disclosure Attack (SDA)
[2] as a faster alternative to the Disclosure Attack, which is
based on the idea that it is possible to statistically isolate
Alice’s sending behavior after observing a large amount of
her message’s sets of receivers. The original SDA is limited
to a specific scenario and was extended later to a more general
user model and more complex mixing algorithms [6].
The Least Squares Disclosure Attack (LSDA) [3] models
profiling as a least squares problem, minimizing the error
between the actual number of output messages and a prediction
based on the input messages.
In this work, we present an analysis of the family of
statistical disclosure attacks [2], [6] and the LSDA [3], which
share the goal of estimating the sending behavior of the users
by combining the set of observations in an appropriate way.
Other approaches that we leave out of our work are the Two-
Sided SDA (TS-SDA) [7] and the Reversed SDA (RSDA)
[8], which assume that users reply to messages; the Perfect
Matching Disclosure Attack (PMDA) and the Normalized
Statistical Disclosure Attack (NSDA) [9], which exploit that
the relationship between sent and received messages is one-
to-one; and the Bayesian inference-based approach, Vida [10].
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
Throughout the text, we will represent vectors using bold-
face lowercase characters and matrices using boldface capital
letters. We will also use 1N to refer to the column vector
whose N elements are equal to 1, and 1N×M to the all-ones
matrix of size N × M . The superscript T will denote the
transposing operation.
a) System Model: Our system consists of a population
of N users, designated by index i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}, which
communicate using a threshold mix. The system works as
follows: every time a user i in our population wants to send a
message to another user j, she encrypts the message and sends
it to the mix. The mix receives and stores the messages until
it has gathered t of them. Then, it transforms the messages
cryptographically to change their appearance and outputs them
in a random order; hence hiding the correspondence between
incoming and outgoing messages. We call this process a round
of mixing, and t is the threshold of the mix.
We denote the number of messages user i sends in round
r by uri . We define the column vector containing all the
messages sent by user i up to round ρ as ui = [u
1
i , u
2
i , ..., u
ρ
i ]
T ,
and the matrix of all observed inputs to the mix as U =
(u1,u2, ...,uN ). Likewise, we denote the number of mes-
sages user j receives in round r by yrj and define yj =
1
[y1j , y
2
j , ..., y
ρ
j ]
T and Y = (y1,y2, ...,yN ). Additionally, we
define u˜ri as a binary representation of u
r
i , denoting whether
there is at least one message sent by user i in round r (u˜ri = 1)
or not (u˜ri = 0). We also define, u˜i = [u˜
1
i , u˜
2
i , ..., u˜
ρ
i ]
T .
User i sends messages to their recipients according to her
sender profile and her sender frequency. We define the sender
profile of user i as qi = [p1,i, p2,i, ..., pN,i]
T , where pj,i
models the probability that user i sends a message to user
j. The sender frequency fi models the probability that a
message arriving to the mix comes from user i (fi ≥ 0
for i = 1, 2, ..., N and
∑N
i=1 fi = 1). We also define the
vector pj = [pj,1, pj,2, ..., pj,N ]
T which shall come in handy
later. We make no assumptions on the distribution of each
sender profile, other than pj,i ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, ..., N and∑N
j=1 pj,i = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N .
We define the uniformity of the sender profile of user i as
µi = 1 −
∑N
j=1 p
2
j,i. The uniformity µi ranges from 0, when
user i always sends messages to the same contact (i.e. pk,i = 1,
pj,i = 0 for k ∈ {1, ..., N} and j 6= k, j = 1, ..., N ), to
N−1
N
,
when she sends messages to all the other users equiprobably.
Finally, we define the background traffic of a user i as
an aggregate of the traffic generated by all users but i. This
way, vector ub contains the messages sent by all users but
i, ub =
∑N
k=1
k 6=i
uk = 1ρ · t − ui. The background profile is
qb = [p1,b, p2,b, ..., pN,b]
T where pj,b =
∑N
k=1
k 6=i
fk
1−fi
· pj,k and
the uniformity of this sender profile is denoted by µb. In all
cases, user i will be clear from the context.
b) Adversary Model: We consider a global passive adver-
sary that observes the system during ρ rounds. The adversary
observes the identity of the users communicating through the
mix and knows all the parameters of the system. We also
assume that the adversary is not able to link any messages
by their content, i.e. the cryptographic transformations do not
leak information.
The goal of the adversary is to infer the sending behavior of
the users in the system from the observations, i.e. to obtain an
estimator pˆj,i of pj,i given the input and output observations
U and Y .
IV. REVISITING THE FAMILY OF DISCLOSURE ATTACKS
A. The Original Statistical Disclosure Attack
Danezis introduced the original Statistical Disclosure Attack
(SDAd) in [2], which provides an estimator of pj,i under the
assumptions that the user i does not send more than one
message each round and the background traffic for that user
is uniform, i.e. pj,b =
1
N
for j = 1, 2, ..., N .
Danezis claims that, by using the Law of Large Numbers,
the mean of the observations yrj in the rounds where i has sent
at least one message can be written as
u˜Ti yj
u˜Ti 1ρ
≈ pj,i + (t− 1) · pj,b , (1)
and therefore an estimator for pj,i is
pˆSDAdj,i =
u˜Ti yj
u˜Ti 1ρ
− (t− 1) · pˆj,b , with pˆj,b =
1
N
. (2)
In order to compare SDAd with its variants, note that we can
write (1) as
u˜Ti yj ≈ u˜
T
i 1ρ · pj,i + u˜
T
i (1ρ · t− 1ρ) · pj,b . (3)
B. Generalized Statistical Disclosure Attack
Mathewson and Dingledine extended Danezis’ attack in [6],
allowing user i to send multiple messages in a round and
estimating the background from the observations.
Using this extension, (3) becomes
u˜Ti yj ≈ u˜
T
i ui · pj,i + u˜
T
i ub · pj,b , (4)
where we have just replaced the 1ρs which referred to the
number of messages sent by user i in each round in (3) with the
actual number of messages sent by i, ui, and 1ρ · t−ui = ub.
The background profile is estimated by computing the
average number of messages received by j in the rounds where
i does not participate and dividing by the total number of
messages exiting the mix each round (t),
pˆj,b =
1
t
·
(1ρ − u˜i)
T
yj
(1ρ − u˜i)
T
1ρ
. (5)
We denote this attack by SDA0, whose estimator is
pˆSDA0j,i =
u˜Ti yj
u˜Ti ui
−
u˜Ti ub
u˜Ti ui
· pˆj,b . (6)
C. Improvements in the Generalized SDA
The attack described in the previous section performs an
average of the outputs in those rounds where user i sends at
least one message in order to compute pˆSDA0j,i , giving the same
value to those outputs regardless of the actual participation of
user i. We propose a new estimator, which we denote SDA1,
that counts the outputs once for every message sent by user
i, therefore giving more weight to those rounds where the
number of messages sent by i is larger.
Using this approach, (4) becomes
uTi yj ≈ u
T
i ui · pj,i + u
T
i ub · pj,b , (7)
where we have replaced the vector we used to select the rounds
we were taking into account, u˜i, by the vector with the actual
number of messages sent by i in each round, ui.
From (7), we get the following estimator,
pˆSDA1j,i =
uTi yj
uTi ui
−
uTi ub
uTi ui
· pˆj,b , (8)
where pˆj,b is estimated as in (5).
Note that the idea behind this estimator appears in [6]
applied to other mixing algorithms. The analysis of SDA in [6]
also features the idea of exploiting observations from rounds
where user i appears as a sender in order to compute pˆj,b.
The latter idea inspires our second variant, denoted SDA2,
which uses the observations from all rounds to get the back-
ground estimation. Following (7), we can write{
uTi yj = u
T
i ui · pˆj,i + u
T
i ub · pˆj,b
uTb yj = u
T
b ui · pˆj,i + u
T
b ub · pˆj,b .
(9)
2
If we define the ρ × 2 matrix Ui,b = (ui,ub), the new
estimator pˆSDA2j,i can be obtained by solving(
pˆSDA2j,i
pˆj,b
)
=
(
Ui,b
TUi,b
)−1
Ui,b
Tyj . (10)
D. The Least Squares Disclosure Attack
The estimator in (10) uses the information from all outputs
when estimating both pj,i and pj,b. However, users’ profiles
are solved independently, compressing information in matrices
Ui,b. We can extend the idea in (9) considering that, when
computing the sender profile of i, the background is formed
by all the users but i. In that case, we would have N equations
with N unknowns, which are
uTi yj = u
T
i
N∑
k=1
(uk · pˆj,k) , for i = 1, ..., N . (11)
Presenting this system in matricial form, we have
UTyj = U
TUpˆj . (12)
Therefore, if UTU is not singular, we obtain the Least
Squares Disclosure Attack (LSDA) estimator in [3],
pˆLSDAj =
(
UTU
)−1
UTyj . (13)
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we aim at deriving a theoretical expression
for the Mean Squared Error of sender profile i, which we
define as MSEi
.
= ||qi − qˆi||
2 =
∑N
j=1 (pj,i − pˆj,i)
2
, for the
described estimators. Due to space limitations, we reduce our
analysis to SDA2 and LSDA.
We start by deriving an expression of MSEi in LSDA. In
order to do so, we first show, by using the law of total
expectation together with E
{
yj |U
}
= U · pj , that this
estimator is unbiased, since
E{pˆj} = E {E {pˆj |U}} = E
{(
UTU
)−1
UTE
{
yj |U
}}
= pj
(14)
Using this fact, along with the law of total variance, we can
write the covariance matrix of pj as
Σpj = E
{
Σpj|U
}
= E
{(
UTU
)−1
UTΣy
j
|UU
(
UTU
)−1}
(15)
We model {ur1, ..., u
r
N} together as a multinomial distri-
bution with t trials and probabilities {f1, ..., fN}. In or-
der to compute (15), we first assume that the number of
observations is large enough, so that we can approximate
UTU ≈ E{UTU} = Ru ·ρ, where Ru is the autocorrelation
matrix of the input process,
Ru = t [F+ (t− 1)F1N×NF] (16)
where F = diag{f1, ..., fN}.
Applying the matrix inversion lemma, we can write the
inverse of this autocorrelation matrix as
R−1u =
1
t
[
F−1 −
(
1−
1
t
)
1N×N
]
. (17)
Now that, using UTU ≈ Ru · ρ, the only term remaining
inside E{·} in (15) is E{UTΣy
j
|UU}. We model y
r
j |U as the
sum of N binomial processes with uri trials and probabilities
pj,i, for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Let sj,k = pj,k · (1 − pj,k) and Sj =
diag{sj,1, ..., sj,N}. Then, Σy
j
|U is a diagonal matrix whose
(r, r)-th element is
(
Σy
j
|U
)
r,r
=
∑N
k=1 u
r
ksj,k. Operating,
E{UTΣy
j
|UU} =
ρ
{
F
(
ηjt
(3)1N×N + Sj1N×N t
(2) + 1N×NSjt
(2)
)
F
}
+ ρ
{(
ηjt
(2)IN×N + tSj
)
F
}
(18)
where ηj =
∑N
k=1 fksj,k and t
(n) = t · (t−1) · ... · (t−n+1).
Plugging (17) and (18) into (15) we get an approximation
of Σpj . Now, taking each of the diagonal elements of this
matrix, which are Var{pˆj,i} for i = 1, ..., N and adding them
along j to obtain MSEi =
∑N
j=1 Var{pˆj,i}, we finally get
MSELSDAi ≈
1
ρ
{(
f−1i − 1
)(
1−
1
t
)
µ¯LSDA +
f−1i
t
· µi
}
(19)
where µ¯LSDA =
∑N
k=1 fkµk is the average uniformity of the
sender profiles.
Following a similar approach, it can be shown for SDA2
that, when the number of observed rounds is large enough,
MSESDA2i ≈
1
ρ
{(
f−1i − 1
)(
1−
1
t
)
µ¯SDA2 +
f−1i
t
· µi
}
(20)
where µ¯SDA2 = fiµi + (1 − fi)µb is the average uniformity
considering that there are only two users in the system: the
user i and her background.
Note that the only approximations made to derive (19) and
(20) were UTU ≈ E{UTU} = Ru · ρ and its equivalent
with matrix Ui,b. Therefore, these MSE estimators are more
accurate as the number of observed rounds is large.
Given the definition of the background sending profile in
Sect. III, it is easy to see that µ¯SDA2 ≥ µ¯LSDA, and therefore
MSESDA2i ≥ MSE
LSDA
i , where the equality holds only when all
users have the same sending profile. This proves that LSDA
will eventually outperform SDA2 in terms of MSE when the
attacker observes the system indefinitely.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of the attacks in Sect. IV in
terms of MSEi, simulating a threshold mix system as described
in Sect. III.1 We exclude SDAd from this evaluation and use
its generalization SDA0 instead.
We vary the number of users in the population N , the
threshold t, the sending frequencies fi, the number of rounds
observed by the attacker ρ and the uniformity of the sending
profiles µi.
1The simulator, written in Matlab, will be available upon request.
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Fig. 1. Average MSE for the different attacks, as a function of the number
of friends nf of each user (ρ = 20000, N = 100, fi = 1/N , t = 10).
A. Performance with respect to the uniformity µi
As we have shown in Sect. V, the uniformity of the
sender profiles is a key parameter to show the difference
in performance between SDA2 and LSDA. For simplicity, we
assume that each user i has nf friends to whom she sends
messages uniformly, which are users mod (i + k,N) for k =
0, ..., nf−1. This allows us to vary the uniformity of the sender
profile of each user with a single parameter: µi =
1−nf
nf
. We
choose the number of friends nf from {10, 25, 50, 100} and,
for each value, perform 100 repetitions of the experiment.
Figure 1 shows a box-and-whiskers plot of the average MSE
per sender profile, MSEi. On the boxes, the central mark is
the mean and the edges are the 25th and 75th percentiles.
The black circles • represent the theoretical asymptotic values
of the MSEi, from (19) and (20). Since ρ is finite, MSEi
does not coincide exactly with its theoretical value, although
(19) and (20) reliably describe the accuracy of the attacks. As
expected, when the uniformity of the sender profiles is low and
the background uniformity µb is large, LSDA outperforms the
other estimators, but as the uniformity of each user increases
and therefore becomes closer to the background uniformity,
the advantage of LSDA decreases. Also, note that the proposed
estimators SDA1 and SDA2 outperform SDA0.
B. Performance with respect to the other parameters
Due to space limitations, we are not able to plot the
results obtained when varying all the other parameters. We
summarize the basic results next and refer to [3] for further
information about LSDA. First, the MSEi decreases with
1/ρ in each of these attacks, as in (19) and (20). Also, in
every attack, the MSEi is approximately proportional to the
inverse of the sending frequency f−1i , due to the increasing
difficulty of estimating the sender profile of a user when she
rarely participates in the system. The threshold t has little
influence on the MSEi of SDA2 and LSDA but does, however,
decrease the number of rounds that can be used to estimate
the background (5) in SDA0 and SDA1, thus increasing the
MSEi in these estimators. Finally, we note that increasing N
adds an extra error in LSDA which is not predicted by (19)
and that stems from the matrix inversion in (13). This error
can be reduced by increasing the number of rounds observed.
This can be seen in Fig. 1, where the mean values of MSEi
obtained for LSDA are slightly above their asymptotic value.
The improvements in performance achieved by the more
sophisticated versions of statistical disclosure come at the price
of an increase in the computational cost. While SDA0 adds
the observations where the user whose profile is being esti-
mated has participated, SDA1 needs to perform an additional
multiplication for each of these rounds. SDA2 has a higher
computational cost since it requires solving a system of two
equations for each user, and LSDA requires solving a linear
system of N equations with N unknowns.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have introduced a framework to model the
different attacks of the statistical disclosure family, showing
how better results can be achieved when performing more
complex operations with the observations from the system. We
have formalized two new variants of the SDA, which we called
SDA1 and SDA2, and showed that they significantly improve the
state-of-the-art SDA in threshold mixes, SDA0. Furthermore,
we have shown that the LSDA, introduced in [3], can be seen
as an upgraded version of statistical disclosure that solves the
problem jointly for all users.
We have also improved the previous theoretical analysis
on LSDA and derived for the first time an expression which
accurately approximates the error of SDA2. Our experiments
confirm these theoretical results.
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